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Judge-made law has played a crucial role in the process of European integration. In the 
vertical dimension, it has greatly reduced the range of autonomous policy choices in 
the member states, and it has helped to expand the reach of European competences. 
At the same time, however, “Integration through Law” does have a liberalizing and de-
regulatory impact on the socioeconomic regimes of EU member states. This effect is 
generally compatible with the status quo in liberal market economies, but it tends to 
undermine the institutions and policy legacies of Continental and Scandinavian so-
cial market economies. Given the high consensus requirements of European legislation, 
this structural asymmetry cannot be corrected through political action at the European 
level. 
Zusammenfassung
Das Richterrecht hat eine entscheidende Rolle im Prozess der europäischen Integra-
tion gespielt. In der vertikalen Dimension hat es den Bereich autonomer Politik der 
Mitgliedstaaten wesentlich eingeschränkt und zugleich die Reichweite europäischer 
Kompetenzen ausgedehnt. Die „Integration durch Recht“ hatte aber zugleich auch eine 
stark liberalisierende und deregulierende Wirkung auf die sozioökonomischen Rege-
lungssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten. Diese Wirkung war vereinbar mit dem Status quo 
der „liberalen Marktwirtschaften“, aber sie untergräbt die Institutionen und Politik-
traditionen der „sozialen Marktwirtschaften“ auf dem europäischen Kontinent und in 
Skandinavien. Angesichts der hohen Konsenshürden der europäischen Gesetzgebung 
kann diese Asymmetrie nicht durch politisches Handeln auf der europäischen Ebene 
überwunden werden.
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The conclusion that, in a federation, certain economic powers, which are now generally 
wielded by the national state, could be exercised neither by the federation nor by the 
individual states, implies that there would have to be less government all round if 
federation is to be practical (Friedrich A. Hayek 1948 [1939]).
Will history repeat itself? The ideological hegemony of orthodox liberalism ended with 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, and it may well be that the current global crisis will 
also end the quarter-century of triumphant neoliberalism not only in Obama’s America 
and in the International Monetary Fund, but also in the European Union. And in fact, 
after decades of cheap talk about the “social dimension” of European integration or the 
superiority of the European social model over American capitalism, Christian Demo-
crats and Social Democrats have finally managed to write the commitment to create a 
European social market economy into the hard letter of Art. 3 (3) of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the European Union. So the finalité of the European political economy is going to be 
redefined by the ideas that have shaped the socially inclusive and institutionally coor-
dinated social market economies (SMEs) on the Continent and in Scandinavia, rather 
than by the liberal market economies (LMEs) of the Anglo-Saxon countries and some 
of the new member states. Or so one might think. 
F. A. Hayek, however, the doyen of market liberalism, would have disagreed. Writing 
in 1939, in the heyday of post-Depression (i.e. Keynesian) economics and politics and 
before the beginning of the war that would leave Europe in shambles, he anticipated 
postwar European integration. And he was sure that integration would be good for 
market liberalism – not because of any hopes for its renewed ideological hegemony, but 
because it would reduce the institutional capacity of the state to govern the capitalist 
economy and to burden it with a large welfare state. Hayek’s insights were never lost on 
his neoliberal followers who supported European integration not so much on economic 
than on normative-political grounds (e.g., Mestmäcker 1988; Buchanan 1995/96). But 
it seems that they were neither understood by the Christian and Socialist “founding 
fathers” of European integration – the Schumans, DeGasperis, Adenauers and Spaaks – 
nor by subsequent generations of “good Europeans” in politics, trade unions and aca-
demia whose ideological preferences or manifest interests were quite opposed to unfet-
tered market liberalism. 
One reason is that the liberalization that Hayek foresaw was slow in coming. He had as-
sumed that political integration would come first, and that a strong federal government 
would then create a common market and centralize the policies that could interfere 
with it. At the same time, however, conflicts of interest among member states were sup-
posed to prevent the creation of a strongly redistributive welfare state whose burdens 
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would fall unequally on economically strong regions. In Europe, however, the historical 
sequence occurred in reverse order, with political integration postponed after the Euro-
pean Defense Community failed in 1954. The European Economic Community began 
as a customs union whose members were committed to creating a successful common 
market that they hoped would eventually facilitate political integration as well. In the 
meantime, the EEC attempted to remove barriers to trade through intergovernmental 
negotiations, while its member states took charge of social regulations, social transfers, 
public services and public infrastructure functions. 
For more than two decades, this de facto division of functions between the Community 
and its member states remained essentially intact. And as long as that was true, there 
was little reason to worry about the impact of European integration on the interests and 
values that were served by the existing domestic socioeconomic regimes. Since the early 
1980s, however, economic integration has accelerated and intensified and the liberal 
transformation which Hayek had expected has indeed been taking place in the multi-
level European polity. For the Continental and Scandinavian social market economies, 
this transformation has become increasingly disruptive, and it is important to under-
stand its causes. Was it brought about by the political dominance of certain (neoliberal) 
ideological preferences, in which case there might still be hopes for a political reversal? 
Or was it the belated but inexorable consequence of the structural factors associated 
with the integration of heterogeneous nation states that Hayek postulated?
In the literature, the most influential attempts to explain European liberalization re-
fer to the interests, ideologies and strategies of influential political actors. In Andrew 
Moravcsik’s (1998) account, every step that has deepened economic integration and 
liberalized regulatory regimes is explained by the (primarily economic) interests and 
preferences represented by governments of the larger member states. By contrast, Ni-
colas Jabko (2006) attributes the surge of liberalizing legislation to the Commission’s 
“strategic constructivism,” which persuaded a heterogeneous coalition of political ac-
tors that “the market idea” was the solution to all that was wrong in Europe. At the 
time however, unanimity was still the decision rule of the Community. So some of the 
smaller member states could easily have blocked initiatives serving the interests of the 
big three, and there surely must also have been veto players who were not lured by the 
pied pipers of neoliberalism. So why didn’t these dogs bark? 
The basic difficulty with both of these explanations, interest-based or ideological, is 
that they focus exclusively on the agency of purposeful actors while ignoring the (in-
stitutional) structure within which actors must define their strategic choices (Giddens 
1984). They try to explain Treaty revisions and legislative action by reference to the 
interests, preferences, worldviews and strategies of actors in national governments, the 
Commission and the European Parliament while ignoring or downplaying the effect of 
formal and informal decision rules and the impact which judicial decisions have on the 
available options of political actors. Instead, structure and agency should be considered 
as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, explanatory approaches (Scharpf 
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1997). In the highly structured European policy processes, decision rules – and, more 
generally, institutions – are bound to create strong asymmetries, favoring some actors 
and some policy goals, and impeding or obstructing others.1
The present essay will explore the impact of two institutional asymmetries: the first 
one favoring policy-making by nonpolitical actors and impeding political action at the 
European level, and the second one favoring negative integration and impeding specific 
policies of positive integration (Scharpf 1999: ch. 2). These institutional asymmetries, 
I will then try to show, have the effect of undermining the institutions and policy lega-
cies of “social market economies” at the national level, and they also impede efforts to 
re-create similar institutions and policies at the European level. 
1 Integration through politics and integration through law
The first of these asymmetries concerns the relationship between legislative and judicial 
powers in the processes of European integration. In the original allocation of functions, 
European integration was to be achieved either by intergovernmental agreement on 
amendments to the Treaties or by European legislation initiated by the Commission and 
adopted by the Council of Ministers. As a consequence, member governments retained 
control over the extent and the speed of economic unification and liberalization.2 After 
1 Some readers have suggested that by focusing exclusively on structural conditions, the follow-
ing text seems to argue not for a balance between structure and agency, but for a structural 
determinism that leaves no room for the potential of creative agency. The short response is that 
my purpose here is to make actors more aware of the structural obstacles they would have to 
overcome if they tried to create a European social market economy. At a more theoretical level, 
what I will describe here is a pattern of distributed competences but interdependent policy 
choices. Of course, the Court could have chosen different interpretations of the Treaties, and 
the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, political parties and organized actors could have 
responded differently to the evolution of the case law and to opportunities for Treaty revision. 
If all these choice options could have been combined and employed in a concerted fashion, the 
overall process of integration could of course have taken a very different direction. But such 
instances of “positive coordination” are extremely demanding and very rare even in the hierar-
chical organization of a national government (Mayntz/Scharpf 1975: 145–150; Scharpf 1997: 
112–114, 132–135). In the constellations of EU policy making, however, multiple actors with 
differing worldviews are pursuing different goals. Hence the far more likely outcome is “nega-
tive coordination,” where each actor considers only its own, limited competences and tends to 
treat the positions of others as given when assessing its own strategic options. In other words, 
the structural constraints are mutually created and reproduced by strategic actors with distrib-
uted powers and non-holistic action perspectives.
2 This is not so in the field of competition law, including the control of “public undertakings,” 
“services of general economic interest” and of “state aids” (Arts. 81–98 ECT), where the Com-
mission may intervene directly against distortions of competition – leaving it to the affected 
parties to appeal to the Court.
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tariff barriers had been removed, further progress on the removal of non-tariff barriers 
was to be achieved through the legislative harmonization of national rules. Thus gov-
ernments would decide when trade would be liberalized and for which products; when 
controls over capital movements would be lifted and to what extent; which conditions 
would permit workers to seek employment and firms to provide services or establish un-
dertakings in another member state, and so on. Since the Luxembourg Compromise of 
1966 had prolonged the practice of unanimous decision-making, all governments could 
be sure that no legislation could remove existing economic boundaries without their 
agreement (Palayret et al. 2006). As long as this condition went unchallenged, member 
states could also control the interaction effects between economic liberalization and 
the functional requirements of their nationally bounded welfare states, their systems of 
industrial relations, and their public revenue, public services and public infrastructure 
functions. In other words, the member states could ensure that even in the EEC, eco-
nomic integration would not exceed the limits of what John Ruggie (1982) described as 
the “embedded liberalism” of the postwar world economy – that is, a regime in which 
markets would be allowed to expand within politically defined limits that would not 
undermine the preconditions of social cohesion and stability at the national level.
Initially, moreover, these preconditions were fairly similar in the Original Six, all of 
which had fairly large Bismarckian-type pension and health care systems that were 
primarily financed by wage-based contributions. They also had highly regulated labor 
markets and industrial-relations systems, and all had a large sector of public services 
and infrastructure functions that were either provided directly by the state or in other 
ways exempted from market competition. Since France had also succeeded in gain-
ing Treaty protection for its more stringent rules on gender equality in the workplace 
while agriculture was to be organized in a highly regulated, subsidized and protectionist 
regime, disagreement on the pace of integration in the competitive sectors of the econ-
omy was relatively moderate. All that changed, of course, with the first enlargement, 
which brought the UK, Denmark and Ireland into the Community – and thus member 
states with very different types of liberal and social democratic welfare states and labor 
relations (Esping-Andersen 1990), different agricultural interests and, in the case of Ire-
land, a very different state of economic development. At the same time, moreover, the 
world economy was shaken by the first oil-price crisis, and while all national economies 
were in deep trouble, they diverged widely in their sometimes protectionist responses 
to the crisis (Scharpf 1991). 
As a consequence of the greater diversity of member-state interests and preferences, the 
harmonization of national rules through European legislation became more difficult. 
And as European markets continued to be fragmented by incompatible national prod-
uct standards and trade regulations, it seemed that legislative integration might not 
progress much beyond the customs union that had been achieved in the first decade. 
In the face of political stagnation, therefore, hopes turned to the possibility of judicial 
solutions that might bypass political blockades in the Council. This presupposed that 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would be willing and able to engage in large-scale 
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judicial legislation. It would have to interpret the unchanged text of the Treaties in ways 
that would propel European integration beyond the frontier that had been reached un-
der the high consensus requirements of political legislation. 
The doctrinal groundwork for this option had already been laid in the early 1960s by 
two bold decisions of the Court. The first one interpreted the commitments that mem-
ber states had undertaken in the Treaty of Rome not merely as obligations under in-
ternational law but as a directly effective legal order from which individuals could de-
rive subjective rights against the states.3 The second one asserted the supremacy of this 
European legal order over the law of member states.4 With these decisions, the Court 
claimed a status for Community law that differed fundamentally from that of all other 
international organizations. Why and how they came to be accepted has become a fas-
cinating research question.5 The most convincing explanation focuses on the response 
of national courts to the referral procedure of Art. 234 (ex 177) ECT:6 The option of 
requesting the preliminary opinion of the ECJ on issues requiring the interpretation of 
European law had the effect of empowering ordinary national courts in the course of 
ordinary litigation to review the validity of national legislation – which may have been 
particularly attractive for lower-court judges.7 Moreover, as Burley and Mattli (1993: 
44) and Maduro (1998: 11, 16–25) have pointed out, acceptance by national courts 
and academic lawyers was facilitated by the Court’s strict adherence to a style of formal 
reasoning that emphasized logical deduction from legal principles (even if these had 
originally been self-postulated) rather than the analysis of substantive economic or so-
cial problems or policy goals that might justify the particular interpretation. 
The strategy of using law “as a mask for politics” (Burley/Mattli 1993: 44) also helped to 
immunize judicial legislation against political objections. In cases referred to the ECJ, 
the government whose laws were challenged was not necessarily directly involved as a 
litigant, and if it was, it was bound to present its objections within the court-defined 
frame of legal reasoning. Since the Court tended to announce far-reaching doctrinal in-
novations in cases with low or even trivial substantive importance, it would have been 
difficult or impossible to mobilize political opposition against the Court’s jurispru-
dence at the national level, let alone the European one. Yet once the “habit of obedience” 
(Maduro 1998: 11) was established, European law, as interpreted by the ECJ, was woven 
into the fabric of the law of the land, which ordinary national courts apply in ordinary 
litigation. To challenge an ECJ ruling, then, governments would have to confront their 
3 Van Gend & Loos, C-26/62, 5.2.1963.
4 Costa v. Enel, C-6/64, 15.7.1964.
5 See for example Burley/Mattli (1993); Garrett (1995); Mattli/Slaughter (1995); Slaughter et al. 
(1998); Alter (2001); Stone Sweet (2004).
6 Haltern (2007: 187) calls it the “crown jewel among European procedures of legal protection 
without which a European rule of law would be unimaginable.”
7 Where judicial review exists nationally and is exercised by the highest court or a specialized 
constitutional court, it may be envied by lower-court judges. It makes sense, therefore, that there 
are fewer referrals from member states without a tradition of judicial review – and with a strong 
tradition of majoritarian democracy (Wind et al. 2009).
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own judicial system and renounce the respect for the rule of law on which their own le-
gitimacy depends (Haltern 2007: 192–194). For all intents and purposes, therefore, ECJ 
interpretations of European law are now “higher law” in the member states. 
The effectiveness of the Court’s judicial legislation is also greatly enhanced by the ex-
treme difficulty of a political reversal. At the national level, courts and constitutional 
courts are of course also involved in law-making through interpretation. But judicial in-
terpretations of a statute may be corrected by simple majorities in parliament, and even 
interpretations of constitutional law could usually be revised by qualified parliamentary 
majorities. By contrast, ECJ decisions based on primary European law could only be 
reversed by Treaty amendments that need to be ratified in all member states. And deci-
sions interpreting secondary European law cannot be corrected without an initiative of 
the Commission that needs the support of at least a qualified majority in the Council, 
and usually an absolute majority in the European Parliament. Given the ever increasing 
diversity of national interests and preferences, such corrections were and are in theory 
improbable and in practice nearly impossible. In other words, ECJ interpretations of 
European law are much more immune to attempts at political correction than is true of 
judicial legislation at the national level. 
By the early 1970s, the basic foundations of judicial power had been built, and the ECJ 
could begin to expand its domain. In the 1960s, it had only intervened against national 
violations of unambiguous prohibitions in the Treaty and against protectionist mea-
sures that were clearly designed to prevent the market access of foreign suppliers. In 
1974, however, a much wider claim was asserted in the Dassonville formula which inter-
preted Art. 28 (ex 30) ECT. This article prohibited “quantitative restrictions on imports 
and all measures having equivalent effect.” In the Court’s view, this now meant that 
“all trading rules enacted by member states which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”8 Under this formula, any na-
tional rules and practices affecting trade could now be construed as non-tariff barriers 
to trade. It was no longer necessary to assert that they served protectionist purposes or 
discriminated against foreign suppliers, or even that any border-crossing transaction 
was involved at all. A potential impediment would suffice to define a national measure 
as having an effect “equivalent to quantitative restrictions” on trade.
Given the practically unlimited sweep of the definition, the existence of a “potential im-
pediment” to the exercise of European economic liberties would not, as such, be a dis-
putable issue in future decisions. But the Court also came to realize that the Dassonville 
formula was too wide to be enforced as a strict prohibition in all cases where it might 
apply. Instead of narrowing the excessive reach of the prohibition, however, the famous 
Cassis decision9 introduced a doctrinal solution that allowed much more flexible con-
8 C-8/74, 11.7.1974 at # 5.
9 C-120/79, 20.2.1979.
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trols over the content of national policy choices. The textual base was found in Art. 30 
(ex 36) ECT, according to which even quantitative restrictions could be applied if they 
served certain specified public-policy purposes, such as “public morality, public order 
or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants …
etc.,” provided that these would not “constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between the Member States” (Art. 30 [ex 36] ECT).10 
On the face of it, however, Art. 30 ECT did not appear very flexible: its somewhat casu-
istic list could be interpreted to completely exempt national rules that served one of the 
specified policy purposes from the reach of Art. 28 ECT. Since the regulation in question 
– a German law specifying the minimum alcohol content of liqueurs – had been present-
ed as a measure protecting human health, and since it applied to domestic and imported 
goods without discrimination, that might have been enough to settle the case. In order to 
avoid this outcome, the Court had to reinterpret the language of Art. 30 ECT. 
The first step was to replace the closed list of exemptions specified by the Treaty with 
its own open-ended formula, according to which “obstacles to movement within the 
Community … must be accepted insofar as those provisions may be recognized as be-
ing necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of com-
mercial transactions, and the defense of the consumer.”11 In this new formula, the spe-
cific exemptions granted by the Treaty were reduced to the status of justifications which 
“may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy” one of the Court-defined 
“mandatory requirements.” And finally, in case the national regulations could not be 
so justified, the Court announced a new rule of “mutual recognition” stipulating that 
products “lawfully produced and marketed in one of the member states” must be al-
lowed in the national market.
By adding new justifications (“fiscal supervision,” “defense of the consumer”) that had 
no basis in the text of Art. 30 (ex 36) ECT and by introducing the new list with “in 
particular,” the Court had visibly gone beyond the outer limits of text-based Treaty 
interpretation and asserted its claim to share the Treaty-amending powers of the unani-
mous member states. But it had done so in a way that was unlikely to provoke political 
opposition, since it seemed to widen, rather than restrict, the domain of permissible 
member-state legislation. Moreover, by extending the range of possible exceptions, it 
introduced a degree of flexibility without having to correct the sweeping Dassonville 
prohibition of all national regulations or practices that might hinder the exercise of 
Treaty-based liberties.12 And it did so by establishing a procedural asymmetry between 
10 Similar exemptions are specified in Arts. 39, 43, 46, 58 ECT.
11 C-120/78, 20.2.1979 at # 8.
12 A correction, limited to the free movement of goods, was later introduced in Keck and Mithouard 
(C-267/91 and C-268/91, 24.11.1993), where the Court distinguished between rules that might 
hinder the access of foreign products to the national market and rules “specifying selling ar-
rangements” to which only a discrimination test should be applied.
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rule and exception: if an impediment to the exercise of European liberties is alleged, 
the Court takes judicial notice of its potential effect – which then establishes the rebut-
table presumption of a Treaty violation. The presumption may be rebutted, however, if 
the member state is able to justify the measure in question by reference to one of the 
“mandatory requirements” accepted by the Court. Yet being treated as exceptions from 
the general rule of free trade, these requirements are to be narrowly interpreted. And 
even if that hurdle is overcome, the measure in question must still pass the Court’s “pro-
portionality” test – where the burden of proof is on the member state13 to show that its 
regulation will in fact achieve the alleged purpose, and that the same policy goal could 
not also be realized by other measures that would restrict trade to a lesser degree.14 
As a consequence, the Cassis formula15 maximizes the Court’s quasi-discretionary con-
trol over the substance of member-state policies. Even in policy areas where no powers 
have been delegated to the European Union, it is for the Court, rather than for national 
constitutions and national democratic processes to determine the legitimate purposes 
of national policy. And it is for the Court, rather than for national governments and 
legislatures to judge the effectiveness and necessity of measures employed in the pursuit 
of allowable policy purposes (Haltern 2007: 741–766). 
The Dassonville and Cassis doctrines were subsequently extended from free trade to 
free service delivery, free establishment, free capital movement, and the free mobility 
of workers (Oliver/Roth 2004).16 In a similar process, moreover, European competi-
13 Dorte Martinsen (2009) has shown that the increasing liberalization of transnational access to 
national health care has largely been achieved by tightening the evidentiary standards for prov-
ing the “proportionality” of restrictive rules.
14 In Cassis the Court held that the German regulation was not effective in serving its alleged pub-
lic-health purpose, and that it was not necessary for achieving its alleged consumer-protection 
purpose (which might also have been achieved by less burdensome labeling requirements).
15 The formula found its definitive and more abstract expression in the Gebhard case (C-55/94, 
30.11.1995), where, with regard to the freedom of establishment, the Court postulated that na-
tional regulations that “are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of a fundamental 
freedom guaranteed by the Treaty” must fulfill four requirements: “they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”
16 There are, however, interesting differences among these liberties with regard to the type of na-
tional regulation that the Court will never allow as a “mandatory requirement.” When the free 
movement of capital and persons is an issue, the court will generally not accept revenue and 
budget concerns as an imperative requirement (Schmidt 2007, 2009c). For the trade in goods, 
regulations of product qualities may be justified, whereas regulations of the conditions of pro-
duction could never justify a restriction on imports. For services, however, where production 
and consumption will often occur uno actu, regulations of the qualifications of service providers 
and the process of service provision could massively affect the quality of the service itself. Hence 
they could not generally be denied the status of a justifiable “mandatory requirement.” This 
explains why the Bolkestein proposal of a services directive met with massive opposition when 
it postulated the mutual recognition of regulations adopted and implemented in the country of 
origin as a general rule.
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tion law has been extended to promote the access of private providers to the service-
public and infrastructure functions that member states had previously excluded from 
the market or protected against unfettered competition (Smith 2001; Biondi et al. 2004; 
Grossman 2006; Ross 2007; Damjanovic/de Witte 2008). In principle, therefore, no area 
of national law, institutions and practices remained immune to the potential reach of 
European economic liberties and the rules of undistorted market competition. 
In other words, by the end of the 1970s, European integration had reached a highly 
asymmetric institutional configuration: Attempts to remove national barriers to trade 
through legislative harmonization continued to be severely impeded by the “joint deci-
sion trap” (Scharpf 1988, 2006), whereas “Integration through Law”17 was able to move 
forward without political interference through the seemingly inexorable evolution of 
judicial doctrines protecting and extending the Treaty-based rights of private individu-
als and firms. As I will argue in the next section, however, this asymmetry between 
judicial and legislative action also had a powerful impact on the capacity for, and the 
direction of, European political legislation.
2 Judicial deregulation and legislative liberalization
Substantively, the main thrust of judicial action is to extend the reach of “negative inte-
gration” (Scharpf 1999). To understand this, one must realize that integration through 
law could only be achieved because, ever since Van Gend & Loos (C-26/62, 5.2.1963), the 
Court had reinterpreted the commitments of member states to create a common mar-
ket as subjective rights of individuals and firms against these member states.18 Without 
this reinterpretation, the doctrine of “direct effect” could hardly have been invoked by 
private litigants in national courts, from where they would reach the European Court 
of Justice through the preliminary reference procedure (Art. 234 ECT). And without 
these private “enforcers” (Kelemen 2003), European law could never have achieved its 
present scope and effectiveness. This has a powerful effect on the substantive direction 
of the ECJ’s case law. 
17 This was the title of a large-scale research and multi-volume publication project coordinated 
at the European University Institute, Florence. See Cappelletti et al. (1985). On the support 
which this concept had received early on from an enthusiastic Euro-law community, see Vau-
chez (2008) and Alter (2009: ch. 4).
18 Remarkably, in two early (and very integration-minded) German commentaries on the Treaty 
of Rome, there is no suggestion of judicially enforceable subjective rights. What is emphasized 
is the empowerment of the Council to adopt directives that will allow the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital, as well as free establishment (von der Groeben/von Boeckh 
1958; Meyer-Marsilius 1960). At the same time, however, relatively small Euro-law associations 
collaborated with the Court to invent, develop, publicize and propagate the legal concepts that 
were used in this transformation of Treaty commitments into constitutionally protected basic 
rights (Vauchez 2008; Alter 2009: ch. 4).
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First, the questions the Court will receive and the cases it will see must inevitably con-
stitute an extremely skewed sample of all the interest constellations that are affected by 
European integration. They will reflect the interest of parties who have a major eco-
nomic or personal stake in increased factor or personal mobility, and who also have 
the financial and organizational resources19 to pursue this interest by seeking judicial 
redress against national laws and regulations (Conant 2002; Kelemen 2003). What the 
Court will not see, however, are cases promoting the interests of the less mobile major-
ity of European individuals and firms (Fligstein 2008) and, even more significantly, 
cases representing the interests that benefit from existing national laws and regulations. 
Since a favorable decision will encourage other parties to exploit the newly granted lib-
erty from national regulation, and to push for its extension to other areas, the evolution 
of the case law will not tend to a stable equilibrium in which opposing interests are fairly 
accommodated (as in the common law of contracts, which can be expected to generate 
a stable balance between the interests of buyers and sellers). Instead, and independently 
from any liberal preferences the judges might entertain, its dynamic expansion will be 
driven by the persistent push of liberalizing interests searching for new obstacles to re-
move20 (Schmidt 2009b). 
It needs to be said, however, that “liberalization” is not necessarily to be understood in 
a market-liberal or neoliberal sense. Given the dominant focus of the Treaty of Rome 
on economic integration, it is of course true that most of the Court’s case law responds 
to the economic interests of business enterprises and capital owners. At the same time, 
however, the Court has, from early on, protected the social rights of migrant workers 
against discrimination on grounds of nationality, and it has expanded the guarantee 
of equal pay for men and women (Art. 141 ECT) into a workplace-oriented regime of 
gender equality (Cichowski 2004). In highly innovative – or even “artistic” (Hilpold 
2008) – decisions, it has also approximated the status of mobile students to that of 
migrant workers and, in the case enforcing access to Austrian universities,21 it has even 
ruled that Austrian taxpayers should pay for the education of German medical students 
who did not qualify for admission at home. At the same time, the (active and passive) 
freedom of service provision was used to allow the access of foreign providers to do-
mestic health care systems, and to require that patients seeking ambulatory and sta-
tionary health care abroad should be reimbursed by their national systems (Martinsen/
Vrangbaek 2008; Martinsen 2009). In the meantime, moreover, the combination of EU 
citizenship, freedom of movement and nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality is 
19 As Lisa Conant (2003) has shown, even consumer interests in liberalized air services could not 
get a hearing before the Court until major air carriers became interested in opening national 
markets.
20 Progress may of course come late in some areas, and slow down temporarily in others. But given 
the constitutional status of Treaty interpretations and the steadying influence of judicial prec-
edents and legal discourse, the overall development is likely to be shaped by the unidirectional 
effect of a “ratcheting mechanism.”
21 C-147/03, 7.7.2005.
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used to minimize national residency requirements that would limit migrants’ access to 
national welfare systems (Wollenschläger 2007; Egger 2008). 
Thus it is indeed true that the rights-based case law of the ECJ is expanding into new 
areas where its evolution is not, or not primarily, driven by the economic interests of 
big firms and capital owners (Caporaso/Tarrow 2008). In that sense, “liberalization” 
should now be treated as a generic term describing mobility-enhancing policies that 
may serve economic as well as noneconomic interests. But that should not be inter-
preted as progress toward the social embeddedness of the European economy or as 
the judicial recognition of the values of social solidarity. Instead, effective systems of 
social solidarity – which presently exist only within member states – may in fact be 
undermined if the legitimating assumptions of a basic reciprocity of rights and obliga-
tions are weakened (Menéndez 2009). Similarly, European citizenship, as defined by 
the Court, is not about collective self-determination. It is about individual rights of 
exit from, and entry into, democratically shaped and collectively financed systems of 
national solidarity (Somek 2008). For the new social liberties as for economic liberties, 
therefore, integration through law maximizes negative integration at the expense of 
democratic self-determination in the national polity.
Of even greater importance is a second structural effect. Given its rights-based interpre-
tation of Treaty obligations, the only remedy the Court can offer to the complaints of pri-
vate litigants is to disallow national regulations that impede factor mobility or personal 
mobility or that violate standards of nondiscrimination. Hence the immediate effect of 
such decisions is to deregulate existing national regimes. What the Court cannot do is 
establish a common European regime that would respond to some of the values and 
policy purposes which, as a consequence of its decisions, can no longer be realized at the 
national level.22 If reregulation should be considered desirable, it could only be pursued 
through political legislation at the European level. And given the high consensus require-
ments of European legislation and ubiquitous conflicts of interest among extremely het-
erogeneous member states, one would indeed expect a strong asymmetry between judi-
cially imposed negative integration and legislative positive integration (Scharpf 1999). 
However, that is only part of the story. In fact, the Dassonville-Cassis line of ECJ deci-
sions has become a most powerful force for the revitalization of European legislation 
– and it also continues to shape the substantive direction of political action at the Euro-
pean level. To appreciate this effect, however, one must take a closer look at the impact 
of the ECJ’s case law on the policy options of national governments. 
On their face, the Treaty-based liberties are explicitly worded to apply only to national 
measures affecting trade and free movement between member states or other border-
22 Maduro (1998: 61–78) suggested that the Court, in a spirit of “majoritarian activism,” may have 
achieved a degree of “judicial harmonisation” by upholding national regulations if they agreed 
with those adopted in most other member states.
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crossing transactions (e.g., Arts. 3[1][a], 3[1][c], 56[1] or 81[1] ECT). In the Court’s 
practice, however, this textual constraint is not generally respected (Oliver/Roth 2004: 
429–434). This ambivalence may, as Maduro (1998: 158–161) argued, reflect an unre-
solved normative conflict between an understanding of European economic liberties as 
safeguards against protectionism or as fundamental principles of a neoliberal or ordo-
liberal “economic constitution.” In positive law, however, the ambivalence also seems to 
have its roots in the wide sweep of the Dassonville formula. If national rules with merely 
potential border-crossing effects can violate European liberties, these rules may be (and 
are in fact) challenged in cases which involve no border-crossing transactions at all. 
Where that is so, the decision must logically apply to domestic transactions as well.23 
And even if Court-defined liberties and competition rules were only applied to border-
crossing transactions, the removal of national boundaries through negative integration 
would still have a major impact on the capacity of member states to shape their internal 
regimes in accordance with their own political preferences. 
The reason is that, in Cassis, the Court had also announced the rule of “mutual recogni-
tion.” If a national impediment to trade did not fit the Court’s list of allowable “manda-
tory requirements,” or failed to pass its “proportionality” test, it could no longer be ap-
plied to exclude imports. Hence, the member state would have to open its internal mar-
ket to all products that were lawfully produced and marketed in their country of origin, 
but it was free to maintain the rule for domestic producers. As a consequence, products 
complying with potentially very different legal requirements would be competing in the 
same market, and domestic suppliers might suffer from “reverse discrimination” favor-
ing competitors from locations with less burdensome rules. In countries with high stan-
dards, one could thus expect administrative difficulties, economic displacement effects 
and political pressures from disadvantaged national producers (Schmidt 2007; Nicolaïdis 
2007; Maduro 2007). In other words, “integration through law” would directly or indi-
rectly undermine the capacity of member states to shape the conditions of production 
and consumption in their own markets according to national political preferences. 
Once this was understood, however, the Cassis doctrine also changed the bargaining 
constellation and incentives that member states faced in the processes of European leg-
islation. While in the past national law had remained in force24 as long as governments 
did not agree on a harmonization directive, the new default condition would now be 
23 In the Volkswagen law case (C-74/07, 23.10.2007), for instance, the rule establishing a blocking 
minority of 20 percent (rather than the more usual 25 percent) was seen as a potential deterrent 
to foreign direct investment, and hence to free capital movement. If this was so, the rule could 
of course not remain in force for German investors alone. In Cassis, by contrast, the minimum 
alcohol requirement for liqueurs (which was seen as an actual constraint to imports) might have 
been maintained for domestic producers – and then might have been challenged as “reverse 
discrimination.”
24 This would not be so in areas over which the Community has exclusive competence, so that 
national solutions are ruled out even if there is no agreement on European legislation (Haltern 
2007: 113–118).
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“mutual recognition.” This, at any rate, was the interpretation that the Commission 
began to spread in its early “communications” (Alter/Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). Rather 
than waiting for appropriate cases to reach the ECJ through referrals from national 
courts, the Commission also stepped up its prosecution of Treaty infringements (op. 
cit.: 548; Stone Sweet 2003: 40). The immediate effect of the Court’s decisions, the Com-
mission’s communications, and the actual or threatened infringement prosecutions was 
to create an atmosphere of legal uncertainty in which the continued viability of a wide 
range of national regulations was thrown into doubt (Schmidt 2008). 
The Commission responded to this (largely self-created) uncertainty with reform pro-
posals that would reempower integration through political legislation. Its white paper 
on “Completing the Internal Market” (Commission 1985) specified a strategy for more 
rapid legislative integration on which a diverse coalition of economic interests and 
political actors could converge. The campaign culminated in the Single European Act 
(SEA) of 1986 which, in Art. 95 ECT, reduced the consensus requirements of political 
action by introducing qualified-majority voting in the Council for measures serving the 
completion of the Internal Market. 
The literature explains the success of these reform proposals and the dramatic increase 
in the volume of liberalizing legislation either by the liberal preferences of the British, 
French, and German governments in the mid-1980s (Garrett 1992, 1995; Moravcsik 
1998) or by the Commission’s ideological entrepreneurship, which sold the market idea 
as a general solution to Europe’s problems (Jabko 2006). I see no reason to exclude these 
factors from an overall explanation. But they pay inadequate attention to the extent to 
which the Dassonville-Cassis line of recent ECJ decisions had undermined the veto posi-
tions of member states that had previously opposed European legislation. Faced with the 
prospect of haphazard judicial interventions against existing national regulations, and 
with the threat of Treaty-violation prosecutions launched by the Commission, the relax-
ation of the unanimity rule to facilitate the adoption of common European standards 
must have appeared as a lesser evil. This is by now well understood (Stone Sweet 2003, 
2004; Schmidt 2009a, 2009c; Alter 2009). What is less obvious, however, is the effect of 
judicial decisions on the substantive direction of subsequent European legislation. 
Nevertheless, the Single European Act and subsequent Treaty amendments have not only 
established new legislative competences of the Community; they have also launched 
an increasing volume of effective European legislation in areas where national compe-
tences have been constrained by the Court. Some of this legislation, it is true, merely 
systematizes and regularizes the case law and thus contributes to more transparent 
negative integration. But in quite a few areas, such as work safety, consumer protection 
and environmental protection, European legislation has adopted rather demanding 
standards that represent impressive achievements of positive integration. At the same 
time, there are other areas, such as capital taxation or industrial relations, where the 
Court’s protection of economic liberties prevents action at the national level, but where 
neither liberalizing nor regulatory legislation could be adopted at the European level. 
18 MPIfG Working Paper 09/ 12
The question of how these cross-sectional differences might be explained ought to be 
high on the research agenda of European legislative studies.25 Since all legislation will 
at least require qualified majorities in the Council, one should certainly expect that the 
degree of harmony or conflict among the original interests and preferences of national 
governments will make a difference. But how these preferences will affect the legislative 
outcome is greatly influenced by the jurisdiction of the ECJ and, in particular, by differ-
ences in the application of the Cassis formula. 
In policy areas where the general drift of the case law has been hostile to national regula-
tions, the default condition of political negotiations is the rule of “mutual recognition.” 
This will undermine the bargaining power of opponents to liberalization, and the Com-
mission may then be encouraged to propose a liberalizing directive that consolidates 
and generalizes the accumulated case law.26 A case in point appears to be the recent 
proposal of a directive that summarizes ECJ decisions on the rights of patients to be re-
imbursed for health care obtained abroad.27 But the Commission may also be tempted 
to exploit its greater bargaining power by proposing a directive that pushes liberaliza-
tion beyond the front lines that had already been secured by the Court. When that is the 
case, the affected interests may mobilize political resistance in the Council and in the 
European Parliament, and the liberalization directive may fail or be reduced to a level 
significantly below the Commission’s aspirations. 
This seems to have happened to the “takeover directive” where the Commission had re-
lied on the early “golden-shares” decisions of the ECJ to propose a radical liberalization 
of the market for company control, only to see it rejected by the European Parliament in 
2001. The directive that was finally adopted in 200428 was much more limited in its am-
bitions. But in the meantime, liberalization has gone beyond this directive in the subse-
quent case law of the ECJ (Roth et al. 2008). The pattern was repeated in the case of the 
“services directive,” where the version originally proposed by Commissioner Bolkestein 
was held up in the European Parliament and could only be passed in a version that ex-
cluded a range of public and social services and did not install the “country of origin” 
rule (Schmidt 2009c).29 But the Treaty-based case law itself could not be reversed by 
legislation, and the Commission relies on it in its new proposal on cross-border health 
care that tries to recover some of the ground lost by Bolkestein. Similarly, recent ECJ 
decisions have demonstrated that the “posted workers directive”30 does not prevent the 
25 Gerda Falkner at the Austrian Academy of Sciences (www.eif.oeaw.ac.at) is presently directing a 
project that will record and compare the progress of European legislation across a wide variety 
of policy areas.
26 As Susanne Schmidt (2000) has shown, such directives may be strongly supported by (for-
mer) high-regulation states whose markets the Commission had previously opened through 
infringement prosecutions.
27 COM (2008) 414 final. See Martinsen/Vrangbaek (2008).
28 Directive 2004/25/EC.
29 Directive 2006/123/EC.
30 Directive 96/71 EC.
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Court from invoking the Treaty-based freedom of services provision to strike down 
wage regulations that had been considered allowable under the directive.31 Moreover, 
in fields like corporate taxation or industrial relations, where it seems obvious that both 
more liberalization and more harmonization would be politically unfeasible, the Com-
mission may just leave the matter entirely to the continuing progress of the Court’s case 
law (Ganghof/Genschel 2008).
In other words: The liberalizing effect of judicial decisions may be systematized and 
perhaps radicalized by European legislation. But given the constitutional status of ECJ 
decisions interpreting Treaty-based liberties, political attempts to use legislation in or-
der to limit the reach of liberalization are easily blocked by the veto of “liberal” govern-
ments and, in any case, could not bind the Court and are likely to be frustrated by the 
subsequent evolution of the case law.
The game is different, however, in areas where the Court has, at least in principle, ac-
cepted the legitimacy of national policy purposes, and where some national rules inter-
preted as impediments to free movement or distortions of competition would also sur-
vive its proportionality test – which was most likely for product regulations protecting 
the health and safety of consumers and workers or the environment. Where that is the 
case, the Commission could only remove these impediments by proposing directives 
that would harmonize national rules under Arts. 95 or 96 ECT. But under these condi-
tions, the bargaining constellation is reversed. Now member states with high regulatory 
standards could defend the status quo by vetoing proposals that do not achieve the 
same level of protection. Moreover, the Treaty itself instructs the Commission to aim at 
a “high level of protection” in proposals “concerning health, safety, environmental pro-
tection and consumer protection” (Art. 95 [3] ECT) – which may legitimate policy ac-
tivists among the Commission staff to come up with more ambitious proposals to begin 
with. At the same time, it seems likely that national actors responsible for environmental 
protection, health and safety protection or consumer protection would also prefer more 
effective European rules, provided that the economic pressures of regulatory competi-
tion could be neutralized. And these would at least be reduced by having common rules 
within the EU.32 It is in these areas, therefore, where one could expect, and does indeed 
find, European legislation establishing quite demanding European standards above the 
level of the lowest common denominator, and perhaps also above the level achieved in 
the median member state (Eichener 1997; Pollak 2003; Vogel 2003; Knill 2008). 
31 See C-341/05, 18.12.2007 (Laval); C-346/06, 3.4.2008 (Rueffert); C-319/06, 19.6.2008 (Luxem-
bourg); Joerges/Rödl (2008).
32 In addition, the weakness of cross-sectional coordination in the Council (and probably also 
within the Commission and among committees in the European Parliament) might leave op-
posing interests with less veto power than they could have exerted in interministerial bargaining 
or public debates at the national level. The recent regulation outlawing incandescent household 
lamps (EC 244/2009) might be a case in point.
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3 The vertical and horizontal impact of integration by law
So where does this comparative overview of judicial and political legislation leave us? 
Integration through law has clearly not replaced integration through political legisla-
tion across all policy areas. On the contrary: judicial decisions did provide the crucial 
impulse for the relaunch of European legislation in the second half of the 1980s, and 
they have continued to provide a dynamic stimulus for further legislation ever since. 
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has pushed the domain of European 
law far beyond the frontiers that would and could have been reached if integration had 
continued to depend entirely on the processes of intergovernmental negotiations. In 
the vertical dimension, therefore, ranging from purely national to exclusively European 
governing competences, the jurisprudence of the Court has acted as a persistent and 
effective upward-directed force, extending the reach of European law and constraining 
the autonomy of national institutions and policy choices even in fields that the Treaties 
had explicitly excluded from the domain of European legislation. 
This was possible because by postulating the supremacy doctrine, the Court assumed 
the status of a constitutional court in the relationship between the European Union 
and its member states. But in contrast to the constitutional courts of established fed-
eral states, the law it has created is not intended to identify and protect a stable balance 
between the mandates, legitimacy bases and functional requirements of both levels of 
government. It is an instrument for promoting a dynamic process of ever increasing Eu-
ropean integration. And it is fair to say that in this commitment, the Court not only had 
the full support of the “Euro-law community” (Alter 2009: ch. 4), but that it was also 
vindicated politically by the 1992 program and subsequent Treaty amendments, from 
Maastricht through Amsterdam to Lisbon, which progressively widened and deepened 
the impact of European law. 
For pro-European governments, political parties, organized interests and public me-
dia, the progressive loss of national autonomy was obviously outweighed by the real 
and anticipated benefits of Europeanization. But why is it then that the Constitutional 
Treaty was rejected by referenda in France and the Netherlands, that voter participation 
in European elections is falling and that the anti-European vote is rising in a growing 
number of member states? Why is it that the gap between elite and non-elite support 
for European integration is widening (Hooghe 2003; Fligstein 2008; Haller 2009) and, 
more specifically, why is it that solidly pro-European labor unions and center-right and 
center-left political parties are bewildered by a series of recent ECJ decisions which they 
see as exceeding the powers of the Union and interfering with national norms, institu-
tions and policy choices that have high political salience (see, e.g., Herzog/Gerken 2008; 
Monks 2008; Liddle 2008; Arbeitskreis Europa 2009)? 
The specific decisions, some of which also raised concern in the European Parliament 
(Committee 2009), had disallowed legislation intended to increase employment oppor-
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tunities for the elderly,33 required Austrian universities to admit German students who 
failed to qualify for medical education at home,34 and subordinated the right to strike to 
the freedom of establishment,35 the right to collective bargaining36 and legislative wage 
determination37 to the freedom of service provision, and the legislative determination 
of corporate governance38 to the freedom of capital movement. Nevertheless, even left-
leaning Euro-Law specialists considered these decisions as judicial business as usual and 
failed to see what the political noise was all about (see, e.g., Mayer 2009; Reich 2008). 
The reason is that European integration has ceased to be an idealistic aspiration. It has 
become a reality whose hard-law constraints are increasingly felt in the economic, social 
and personal lives of citizens. And if these citizens are even dimly aware of how Euro-
pean law is produced, they must also realize that the familiar mechanisms that ensure 
political responsiveness in national politics will not protect their interests in European 
decision processes. At the same time, however, pro-European legal discourses and po-
litical rhetoric are still shaped by the idealistic commitment to promoting European 
integration against what they consider protectionist impediments and nationalistic op-
position. As a consequence, there are no meaningful public exchanges between pro-Eu-
ropean elites and national non-elites about the impact of integration on the life-worlds 
of ordinary citizens (V. A. Schmidt 2006). By the same token, European law has no place 
for discussions about the relative importance of European and national concerns. 
In established federal states, by contrast, the constitutional discourse is necessarily bi-
polar, concerned with accommodating and balancing the equally legitimate concerns of 
central and subcentral levels of government. These balances differ in Switzerland, Bel-
gium, Germany and the United States (Obinger et al. 2005), and they may also vary over 
time – as in America, where the rise of national powers during the New Deal and Great 
Society periods was followed by a reassertion of states’ rights in the New Federalism of 
the 1980s. In all federations and in all periods, however, constitutional law and consti-
tutional discourses have a bipolar conceptual structure in which legitimate national and 
subnational concerns have equal normative status. 
In European law and pro-European discourses, however, there are no concepts that 
could identify, define and evaluate legitimate concerns of member states that should be 
beyond the reach of European law. The principle of “subsidiarity,” which was inserted 
into the Treaties at the insistence of the German Länder, could at best impose limits on 
European legislation. It was never meant to limit the judicial interpretation of Treaty-
based liberties (Davies 2006). But even if this were not so, the principle focuses only on 
33 Mangold, C-144/04, 22.11.2005.
34 Republic of Austria, C-147/03, 7.7.2005.
35 Viking, C-438/05, 11.12.2007.
36 Laval, C-341/05, 18.12.2007.
37 Rueffert, C-346/06, 3.4.2008; Luxembourg, C-319/06, 19.6.2008.
38 Volkswagen, C-112/05, 23.10.2007.
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the technical effectiveness and efficiency of regulations at European and national levels, 
ignoring the normative and political salience of the concerns at stake. What’s more, its 
prescriptive content becomes indeterminate when differences in the size, wealth and 
administrative organization of each member state affect the capacity for national so-
lutions. What is subsidiary for Germany need not be so for Cyprus, and the national 
minimum wage law, which Sweden would have had to adopt in order to comply with 
the Laval decision, would have been acceptable in most member states (Schulten 2009). 
But it would provoke a major normative difficulty in Sweden, where wages since the 
1930s have been determined exclusively by collective agreements between highly or-
ganized federated unions and employers’ associations (Meidner/Hedborg 1984; Edin/
Tobel 1997). In other words, European law has no language to describe and no scales to 
compare the normative weights of the national and European concerns at stake. 
This conclusion is not contradicted by the fact that the Court, in Cassis and afterwards, 
has allowed that certain national impediments to the exercise of Treaty-based liberties 
might be justified by “mandatory requirements of public interest”. For one thing, it is 
entirely up to the Court to determine which national concerns may qualify as manda-
tory requirements. For instance, national tax rules that might impede capital mobility 
can never be justified by an interest in raising revenue, even though this surely must be 
among the most fundamental and legitimate concerns of any government (Ganghof/
Genschel 2008). And national measures serving one of the acceptable policy purposes 
are then subjected to a proportionality test that is procedurally skewed against national 
concerns. In other words, the case law does not recognize a sphere of national autonomy 
in which purposes of public policy and the measures through which these are to be real-
ized should be chosen by democratically legitimated political processes. Whenever it is 
claimed that such measures might impede the exercise of European liberties, or might 
violate the prohibitions against discrimination, or might distort market competition, 
national institutions and policy choices are at the mercy of the ECJ’s discretion, which 
is generally guided by a unipolar logic that maximizes Europeanization at the expense 
of national autonomy.39 And it is hard to see how that could be different.40
39 Generally, that is, but not in every case. In Preussen-Electra (C-379/98, 13.3.2001) for instance, 
a German law requiring networks to purchase electricity from renewable sources at prices 
above the market level was not seen as a distortion of competition; in the Brenner Blockade case 
(C-112/00, 12.6.2003), Austria’s non-interference with a demonstration that had temporarily 
blocked the Alpine transit from Germany to Italy was not seen as an impediment to the free 
movement of goods; and in Doc Morris (C-171/07, 172/07, 19.5.2009) the German law requir-
ing pharmacies to be individually owned by a certified pharmacist was not seen as a violation 
of the freedom of establishment. These exceptions appear puzzling to Euro-lawyers who try to 
identify a general logic in the case law. In my view, they are best understood as manifestations of 
the Court’s discretionary power – which, since it can disallow national policy choices with mini-
mal support in the letter of the law, may also allow them for unexpected reasons. By no means, 
however, could these exceptional decisions provide the conceptual foundation for a general, and 
generally fair, balance between crucial European and national concerns.
40 That is, of course, not meant to say that individual decisions could never have gone the other 
way – especially where they did turn on the Court’s interpretation of the proportionality test. As 
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This relationship, moreover, has been immune to attempts at political correction. Mem-
ber states had, in Art. 137 (5) ECT, explicitly ruled out EU legislation over pay, collective 
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, and similar prohibitions were introduced for education 
(Art. 149 [4] ECT), vocational education (Art. 150 [4] ECT), culture (Art. 151 [5] ECT) 
and health care (Art. 152 [5] ECT). But these prohibitions did not prevent the Court 
from disallowing national regulations of the right to strike in Sweden, of pay in Germany 
and Luxembourg, and of education in Austria. Within the doctrinal framework estab-
lished by the case law, member states could at best constrain political legislation at the 
European level, but they could not prevent the Court from extending the reach of Treaty-
based liberties into policy areas that the Treaty had explicitly excluded from the domain 
of delegated powers.41 As long as these liberties are treated as constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights,42 that conclusion cannot be challenged on technical-legal grounds. 
But even if it were technically possible to construct effective hard-law limits of Euro-
pean law, including judge-made European law, it would still be difficult to define the 
policy areas where national autonomy ought to be protected. The German constitution-
al court tried to do so in its recent judgment on the Lisbon Treaty, by postulating limits 
on the potential domain of European powers that are defined by the need to protect 
the “constitutional identity” of EU member states.43 National autonomy should prevail 
in areas where policy choices are specifically shaped by preexisting cultural, historical 
and linguistic understandings (“Vorverständnisse”).44 Among these, the court included 
issues of language, religion, education or family law.45 These “sociocultural” matters 
have admittedly not been at the core of pro-integration policies, and even in the Lisbon 
Treaty they are not included among the exclusive or shared powers of the Union (Arts. 
3 and 4 TFEU). But these areas may well become more salient as the EU moves beyond 
economic integration and seeks to promote sociocultural integration among the “peo-
is true of all courts, the ECJ’s resolution of specific cases is frequently the object of controversial 
discussions in the legal community. But that should not obscure the structural effectiveness of 
the path-dependent doctrinal development: Once the supremacy and direct effect of European 
law had been established, it followed that all Treaty-based subjective rights and liberties would 
override existing national regulations. And once the requirement of discrimination had been 
replaced by the prohibition of “potential impediments” in Dassonville and by the proportion-
ality test and “mutual recognition” in Cassis, the toolset of progressive “negative integration 
through law” was complete – and with it the ratcheting mechanism that secured the front line 
established by judicial liberalization against political reversals through European legislation.
41 The Court’s usual response is that, yes, member states retain the right to shape their own in-
dustrial relations or social security or health care systems. But in doing so, they must of course 
respect the Treaty-based rights of individuals and firms. See for example C-158/96, 28.4.1998 at 
## 16, 19–20 (Kohll).
42 Agustín José Menéndez (2007 at § 31) goes as far as to consider “the effective upholding of the 
four economic freedoms … as a basic precondition for the effective protection of all fundamental 
rights. This presupposes the claim that in the absence of such a protection, peace and material 
prosperity is at risk, and with it, political, civic and socioeconomic rights; or in brief, all rights.”
43 BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009.
44 Ibid. at § 249.
45 Ibid. at § 252.
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ples of Europe.” Even now, it is hard to imagine that national regulations on education 
or family law could remain unaffected by the Court’s interpretation of European mobil-
ity, nondiscrimination and citizenship rights. Even here, therefore, autonomy could not 
be absolute, and a balancing test would need to be applied. If it were to be attempted, 
however, it would also become clear that diversity matters, and that the normative sa-
lience of particular sociocultural issues varies greatly from one member state to another 
(Kurzer 2001).46
Beyond that, however, the German court also defined “constitutional identity” to re-
quire sufficient space for national policy choices shaping the economic and social con-
ditions affecting the lives of citizens – including fiscal and social-policy choices (ibid.). 
This raises still more difficult problems. In contrast to the very limited European com-
petences in sociocultural matters, competences over the economy have been thoroughly 
Europeanized. And since their exercise would inevitably have an impact on social con-
ditions, some social-policy competences were added in later Treaty revisions as well. 
In contrast to the sociocultural sphere, therefore, there is no possibility of arguing for 
a general presumption of national autonomy in the socioeconomic sphere. It is also 
true, however, that EU member states differ greatly in the institutional structures and 
normative premises of their existing economic and social systems, and that the specific 
national configurations have high political salience and may indeed be considered as 
part of the “constitutional identity” of EU member states. 
These differences, which have been all but ignored in legal discourses on European in-
tegration, are the object of a growing body of empirical and theoretical research in 
comparative political economy. In this literature, two distinctions are generally used 
to describe the basic characteristics of the social and economic structures of advanced 
capitalist democracies. The first one was introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his 
account of the “three worlds of welfare capitalism,” labeled “Liberal” (or Anglo-Saxon), 
“Christian Democratic” (or Continental) and “Social Democratic” (or Scandinavian). 
His classification focuses on social-policy and industrial-relations regimes and the ex-
tent to which they are designed to ensure social equality, social security and the “de-
commodification” of labor. The second classification, introduced by Hall and Soskice 
(2001), distinguishes two fundamentally different “varieties of capitalism,” namely “Lib-
eral Market Economies” and “Coordinated Market Economies.” Here the focus is on the 
relationship between the international competitiveness of national economies and the 
nation-specific institutional regimes of corporate governance, corporate finance, labor 
relations, industrial training and industrial R&D. 
46 In national federal constitutions, if the sociocultural identity is highly salient in all regional 
units, the appropriate solution may be a general decentralization of competences, as is true in 
Switzerland. But if such concerns are much more salient in some units than in the rest of the 
polity, asymmetric federalism may grant more autonomy to some regional units than to others, 
as is true in Canada, Spain, or the United Kingdom (Agranoff 1999).
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In both classifications, there is a “Liberal” or “Anglo-Saxon” ideal type in which the role 
of the state is reduced to a minimum. The liberal welfare state provides means-tested 
social assistance and basic social and health services to the needy, but leaves all others to 
look out for themselves in the private investment, insurance and service markets. Simi-
larly, in the liberal market economy, the state creates the preconditions of functioning 
markets by protecting property rights, enforcing private contracts and establishing a 
regime of undistorted competition. Beyond that, it may intervene in the market to pro-
tect public health, work safety, the environment and consumers’ rights. But the liberal 
state is expected to minimize its involvement in the provision of infrastructure func-
tions and services, and it is definitely not expected to interfere with economic interac-
tions in product markets, labor markets, capital markets, skill markets and technology 
markets. 
By contrast, the state in a coordinated market economy is heavily involved in maximiz-
ing the economic benefits of public infrastructure, technology and training policies. Its 
labor markets are highly regulated and relatively inflexible; industrial relations tend to 
be shaped by “cooperative” collective bargaining at the level of industries and firms, and 
interactions between firms and banks and among firms are embedded in relatively sta-
ble network relationships. At the same time, the Continental and Scandinavian welfare 
states provide not just social assistance but social security, by ensuring retirement in-
comes, health care, and unemployment benefits for all. The Scandinavian welfare state 
goes even further, providing universal social services for families with children, for the 
handicapped, and for the elderly. These are financed through steeply progressive taxes 
which, combined with the “solidaristic” wage policies of powerful and monopolistic 
unions, ensure a very high degree of social equality (Scharpf/Schmidt 2000a). 
Both the Esping-Andersen and Hall and Soskice classifications use ideal types to pro-
vide simplified descriptions of highly complex and country-specific configurations. 
Hence the assignment of a country to a particular type will neither capture all features 
of the national institutional constellation,47 nor is it possible to assign all countries to 
nonoverlapping clusters (Ahlquist/Breunig 2009). Moreover, these types were derived 
from configurations that matured in the “golden age” of postwar welfare states and 
mixed economies, and the distinctions have become more blurred in the meantime as 
a consequence of national responses to increasing international (global and European) 
challenges (Scharpf/Schmidt 2000b). Nevertheless, the two methods of classification 
have generated a rich body of comparative research confirming the systemic impor-
tance of the traits used to define the models. 
For present purposes, I will simplify even more by collapsing the social and the econom-
ic classifications into a single distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs) and 
social market economies (SMEs). In other words, the ideal-type LME is assumed to have 
47 For instance, in countries that are generally identified with the “liberal” model, this is true of the 
National Health Service in the UK and of Social Security and Medicare in the United States.
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a liberal market economy and a liberal welfare state; and the ideal SME will combine 
the characteristics of a coordinated market economy with either a Continental or Scan-
dinavian type of welfare state. This heroic simplification then allows for the construc-
tion of a two-dimensional space in which “Europeanization” and “national autonomy” 
describe the vertical axis of European integration, while the socioeconomic distinction 
between “social regulation” and “liberalization” defines a horizontal axis that is gener-
ally ignored in the Euro-law and Europeanization discourses. The two axes can then be 
used to construct a two-dimensional diagram for mapping the consequences that the 
Europeanization of competences and the widening domain of European law will have 
for member states whose existing institutions differ in the socioeconomic dimension 
(Figure 1).
Figure 1 is meant to show that the Court’s enforcement of economic liberties will have 
the least effect on the institutions and practices of liberal market economies. By the 
same token, the governments of these member states (which by now include not only 
the UK, Ireland and – in some policy areas – the Netherlands, but many Central and 
Eastern European countries as well) have reason to welcome the removal of non-tariff 
barriers in other member states and the creation of competitive markets in sectors that 
other countries had reserved for the public sector or otherwise shielded from competi-
tion. These more liberal market economies can thus be expected to profit from negative 
integration and to support whatever additional initiatives for legislative liberalization 
and deregulation the Commission will propose. 
The situation is very different for countries located near the other end of the socioeco-
nomic spectrum. In the article cited at the beginning, F. A. Hayek (1948 [1939]) had 
expected that in a European federation the competition among national economies 
would bring about a conversion to the liberal model. In the meantime, however, Hall 
and Soskice and their collaborators (2001) have shown that the international competi-
tiveness of “coordinated market economies” benefited from comparative advantages 
created by domestic institutions and practices that both complemented and displaced 
the mechanism of pure market interactions. Given their different production profiles, 
and their orientation to different markets, coordinated economies could be as efficient 
as the liberal ones – in fact, looking at the balance of current accounts, they are gener-
ally more successful in economic terms. At the same time, however, they are extremely 
vulnerable to the deregulation that comes with the legal constraints of negative integra-
tion and liberalization. 
Thus, the Court’s recent decisions are not only disabling crucial features of national 
labor law, industrial relations law and wage setting practices. Its interpretation of the 
freedom of establishment clause also allows firms to evade national rules of corporate 
governance by incorporating in a different jurisdiction.48 Since we already know from 
the Volkswagen case that the Court saw the freedom of capital movement as potential-
48 C-212/97, 9.3.1999 (Centros); Roth (2008).
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ly impeded by a statute defining the blocking minority in the shareholder assembly,49 
there is every reason to expect the same verdict should the ECJ have to review a statute 
requiring the participation of workers on the supervisory board of large companies. In 
short, the Court’s decisions are undermining the institutional foundations on which 
the comparative advantages of coordinated market economies have depended. The lib-
eral transformation, which Hayek had wrongly expected to result from the pressures of 
market competition, is finally occurring under the legal compulsion of ECJ jurispru-
dence (Höpner/Schäfer 2007).50
49 C-112/05, 23.10.2007.
50 It is frequently remarked that much of this transformation has been brought about by national 
legislation. That is both true and unsurprising. First, many instances may be explained by Carl 
Friedrich’s (1937) “law of anticipated reactions”: Realizing the vulnerability of their existing 
regulations under ECJ case law, national governments may prefer orderly adjustment to hap-
hazard judicial interventions. What is often even more important is the fact that the politics 
of social market economies will usually include a sizable segment of actors in political parties, 
interest groups, the media and academe who are committed to market-liberal reforms. For these 
actors, ECJ decisions may open a political window of opportunity in which previously effective 
veto positions are disabled.
Figure 1 The effect of Europeanization on Social Market Economies (SME), Liberal Market 
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The situation is similar when it comes to the characteristic features of different types of 
welfare states (Falkner 2009). Once again, the Court’s interventions to ensure free mo-
bility, undistorted competition and nondiscrimination have no effect on the privately 
provided social services, pensions, and health care that are characteristic of liberal wel-
fare states. Social market economies, by contrast, use a much wider variety of institu-
tional arrangements, including basic pensions financed through tax revenues, compul-
sory pension insurance, or subsidized private pension funds. Similarly, they tend to rely 
on publicly provided social services, on social services provided by subsidized nonprofit 
or private organizations, or on health care provided by public, nonprofit or private or-
ganizations and private practices – which may be financed by general taxation, compul-
sory insurance or by publicly subsidized private insurance, etc. These arrangements are 
of course affected by the impact of European law on tax revenues from mobile capital. 
And since more generous welfare states must necessarily regulate benefits, beneficiaries 
and conditions of reimbursement, they are also vulnerable to legal challenges based on 
European mobility, competition and nondiscrimination rules. 
At the same time, the institutional variety of these solutions increases their vulnerability 
to economic liberties. Whenever social services and transfers are not exclusively pro-
vided by the public sector and financed by general taxation or compulsory insurance, 
they may be challenged under European rules on the freedom of service provision, the 
freedom of establishment, state aids, public procurement and competition law. Admit-
tedly, not all these challenges have been launched yet, and not all will succeed. But ECJ 
and Commission decisions51 have already put enough pressure on publicly subsidized 
charities in Germany to require a market-oriented reorganization of the traditional 
system of social services they provide. The Commission also plans to create compe-
tition regimes for social services that would emulate the market-maximizing models 
established for the telecommunications, transport and energy markets (Ross 2007).52 
It remains to be seen whether the Commission’s plans and the Court’s jurisdiction will 
be modified by Art. 14 of the Lisbon Treaty and Art. 2 of its “Protocol on Services of 
General Interest,” which stipulates that “the provisions of the Treaties do not affect in 
any way the competence of Member States to provide, commission and organise non-
economic services of general interest” (Damjanovic/De Witte 2008).
At the same time, the Court has extended the rights of beneficiaries of publicly or col-
lectively financed health care to avail themselves of more attractive or more timely ser-
vices offered abroad, at the expense of domestic taxpayers or insurance funds (Martin-
sen/Vrangbaek 2008), and the Commission has proposed a “directive on the application 
of patients’ rights in cross-border health care”53 that would systematize and generalize 
51 Commission (2005), for example.
52 See White Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2004) 374; Implementing the Com-
munity Lisbon Programme: Social Services of General Interest in the European Union, COM 
(2006), 177 final.
53 COM (2008) 414 final.
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the case law. Beyond that, the Court’s extension of the rights of personal mobility, non-
discrimination and EU citizenship has reduced or eliminated member states’ control 
over EU migrants’ access to nationally provided public and social services and transfers 
(Hatzopulos/Do 2006; Wollenschläger 2007). 
From the perspective of mobile individuals, these developments must seem attractive. 
But since EU member states differ widely in their normative commitment to solidarity 
and equality, and hence in the level of social services and social transfers they provide 
for their citizens, the Court’s generosity ignores the foundations of the social and politi-
cal construction of solidarity, and it also violates the norms of reciprocity. A British citi-
zen moving to Denmark or a German medical student moving to Austria is allowed to 
claim benefits that a Dane or Austrian moving in the opposite direction could not ob-
tain. In the name of transnational solidarity, the Court has weakened or eliminated the 
nation-state’s control over the balance of contributions and benefits and the boundaries 
of state generosity. This does indeed create incentives for transnational mobility, and it 
may contribute to the interweaving of European societies. At the same time, however, 
the extension of personal mobility rights for individuals creates special burdens for na-
tional welfare states with high levels of collectively financed services and transfers, and 
thus also creates incentives favoring convergence toward the liberal minimum of social 
protection (Menéndez 2009).
In short, Court-imposed negative integration and deregulation will have no great effect 
on the institutions and policies of LMEs with relatively low levels of social regulation 
and minimal welfare states. What’s more, competitive opportunities for LMEs will in-
crease as negative integration opens up and deregulates formerly protected markets in 
other member states. Existing economic institutions in SMEs, by contrast, will be sys-
tematically weakened by the deregulatory effect of negative integration and the compet-
itive pressures resulting from mutual recognition, while their welfare-state institutions 
will be challenged by European competition law, mobility rights and nondiscrimination 
law. In Figure 1, therefore, the existing socioeconomic regimes of SMEs will be pushed 
to the right toward a more “liberal” configuration.
If this comes to pass, and much of it already has, member states with SME institutions 
and political preferences will have to turn to European legislation in order to realize the 
1980s promise of a “social dimension” or the 1990s vision of a “European social model” 
or the current postulate of a “highly competitive social market economy” (enshrined in 
Art. 3, III of the Lisbon EU Treaty). If they do so, however, they will confront a second 
structural asymmetry: high consensus requirements still hamper European legislation, 
even after Lisbon, and generally favor status-quo positions. But this status quo has been 
redefined by negative integration in favor of LME member states. Since the LMEs in 
Europe do not depend on European legislation to maintain their own socioeconomic 
regimes, they are free to veto any European initiatives that would impose more de-
manding regulations on their liberal economies, or that would require more generous 
social benefits. As a consequence, the “European Market Economy” that could at best be 
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brought about through positive integration would resemble the socioeconomic regimes 
of LMEs, rather than recreate a social market economy at the European level. The struc-
tural constraints of European integration have cut off access to the top-left quadrant of 
Figure 1, exactly the location toward which the pro-European Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats would like to move.
4 Conclusion
The evolution of European integration has confirmed Friedrich Hayek’s prediction, 
published in 1939, that the integration of previously sovereign nation-states in Europe 
would reduce the capacity of states to regulate the capitalist economy and to burden it 
with the costs of an expensive welfare state. It took a bit longer than expected, however, 
because member governments initially retained control over economic integration. 
This meant that they were also able to preserve the conditions of “embedded liberalism” 
and thus protect the integrity and diversity of national institutions and policy legacies 
against the pressures of economic competition. Indeed, European social market econo-
mies reached the peak of their development and institutional diversity during the first 
two decades of the Community’s existence. Integration through law changed all that, 
and as a consequence European law, judicial and legislative, is now cutting deeply into 
the substance of the socioeconomic regimes of social market economies. 
Given this state of affairs, governments, political parties, unions, publicists and academ-
ics who are at the same time committed to European integration and to the ideals of 
a social market economy have basically two strategic options, one proactive and one 
defensive. The first one would emphasize political mobilization, persuasion, campaign-
ing and lobbying strategies to overcome the obstacles to creating equivalents to national 
social-market regimes at the European level. From what I have said before, it should be 
clear that I consider this as an extremely difficult and, at best, long-term option which 
will bring little relief to the present problems of social market economies. Above all, its 
protagonists need to realize that, given the consensus requirements of European legisla-
tion, it will not suffice to mobilize political support in Continental and Scandinavian 
member states. The most likely effect would be counterproductive confrontations with 
veto players defending the comparative advantages of liberal market economies. What 
would be needed are initiatives that are attractive from the perspective of both types of 
national regimes. How hard this is likely to be is presently shown by the difficulties of 
reaching agreement on the substance and severity of common European capital-market 
and banking regulations, even though common interests should be at a maximum as 
the worldwide crisis of unregulated financial markets has hurt the liberal economies 
of the UK, Ireland or the Baltic states even more than it damaged the social market 
economies. 
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In any case, I will not pursue this option further, but focus my conclusions on the need 
to defend and protect the national regimes of social market economies against the legal 
compulsions of negative integration. Given the Court’s interpretation of primary Eu-
ropean law, combined with the diversity of socioeconomic regimes at the national level 
and with the high consensus requirements of political action at the European level, it 
is easy to see that this development could not have been prevented and cannot be cor-
rected by European legislation. What is perhaps less clear is that the asymmetry could 
hardly have been avoided and probably cannot be corrected by the European Court of 
Justice itself.54 The most basic reason is that the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking, by 
common-law courts, civil-law courts or by constitutional courts, depends on the obser-
vance of a generalizing logic (Holmes 1881; Esser 1964). The decision must focus on the 
specific facts of a particular case, but it cannot be ad hoc. Even where preexisting rules 
are not available or do not fit, the judge-made rule must satisfy the Kantian categorical 
imperative: it must be possible to defend it as a general rule for all cases of this nature. 
Hence even if the Court had tried to develop criteria for a fair constitutional balance be-
tween European competences and national autonomy, it would have had to define these 
in general terms, which in principle could be applied to the relationship between the 
Union and all its member states. Yet any general criterion defined in the vertical dimen-
sion is likely to have different and highly asymmetric impacts on member states located 
at different positions in the horizontal dimension. Even the “sociocultural” concerns 
discussed by the German constitutional court vary in their normative and political sa-
lience from one country to another, and the socioeconomic differences between social 
market economies and liberal market economies are at the very root of the normative 
tension and political dissatisfaction generated by the recent progress of legal integra-
tion. But they are also at the root of the Court’s problem.
A general rule that would respect politically salient concerns in the most highly regulat-
ed member state (say, Swedish rules on the sale of alcoholic beverages) would obviously 
define European economic competences far too narrowly, but an equally general rule 
that would merely protect the practices of the most liberal member state might mas-
sively interfere with the political identity and legitimacy of SME member states. And if 
the rule were to aim at a compromise between these extremes, it would merely create 
both problems at the same time. To put it another way: in the face of normatively salient 
diversity across national institutions or policy legacies, no general rule could establish 
a fair vertical balance. It is thus entirely understandable that the Court never tried to 
54 See note 40 above. One could of course ask whether the doctrinal development that established 
the dynamic effectiveness of negative integration could have been avoided. But one should not 
forget that the crucial decisions of the 1970s were widely welcomed by pro-European public 
opinion and political actors. And even if Dassonville had not added the prohibition of “poten-
tial impediments” to the rule against discrimination on grounds of nationality, that would not 
have been enough. There would still be legitimate national concerns that can only be protected 
by resort to discriminatory measures – or how else should Austria have protected its medical 
education against the mass inflow of students from Germany.
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define general criteria for a European–national balance. Instead, the Dassonville-Cassis 
formula allowed it to assert the general supremacy of all European concerns, but to 
combine this with the possibility of exceptions that the Court would grant at basically 
its own discretion. 
But even if these exceptions were guided by principles, it should be clear that the Cassis 
formula cannot accommodate the diversity of normative and politically salient national 
concerns. The “mandatory requirements of public interest” that might be invoked to 
justify national impediments are, of course, defined by the Court in general terms. How 
could, what is not mandatory for the UK be mandatory for Sweden? And to the extent 
that applications of the “proportionality test” are guided by criteria, these are of a purely 
technical, and hence universal, character, referring to the effectiveness and necessity of 
European versus national measures, rather than to their normative significance and 
political salience. In fact, the Court has no criteria for dealing with and assessing the 
“legitimate diversity” (Scharpf 2003) of the socioeconomic institutions and policy lega-
cies that are affected by its decisions. 
In each country, such institutions and legacies have often been shaped by intense politi-
cal conflicts and historical compromises – which is why they differ so much from one 
another. Individuals have come to take them for granted and to base their life plans 
on them. That does not mean that they should, or could, be protected against change. 
In fact, the socioeconomic regimes of SMEs are under immense pressures to adjust to 
dramatic changes in their internal and external policy environments. At the same time, 
however, such changes are highly controversial in national politics and they need to be 
defended in public debates by governments facing the sanctions of political accountabil-
ity. Instead, the supremacy of European law allows for judicial interventions that may 
short-circuit these political processes. If these are to be accepted as legitimate, they need 
to be justified by arguments that invoke clearly important European concerns and that 
are highly sensitive to the specific sociocultural and politico-economic concerns that 
are at stake in the particular member state. This the ECJ has never attempted, and it is 
indeed hard to see how it could gain the necessary familiarity and empathy with the in-
stitutional traditions and the political cultures of the EU’s twenty-seven member states. 
But what could be a more acceptable alternative? 
In its decision on the Lisbon Treaty, the German constitutional court saw itself in a bet-
ter position to define limits for the exercise of European powers. Emboldened perhaps 
by its own record of maintaining (or upsetting) the federal balance in Germany, it not 
only urged both houses of parliament to ensure that European legislation would not ex-
ceed the powers conferred to the Union, but also reasserted its own readiness to exercise 
these ultra-vires controls and to defend the core elements of the German “constitutional 
identity.” And, what is more interesting in the present context, it left no doubt that this 
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would also apply to the interpretation of Treaty by agents at the European level.55 In 
other words, the supremacy of European law and the ECJ’s monopoly of interpretation 
are seen to be constrained not only by the “principle of conferral” (Art. 5 ECT; Art. 5 
TEU Lisbon), but also by criteria derived from the national constitution and defined by 
the national constitutional court’s monopoly of its interpretation. 
Being embedded in the German political and normative culture, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht has of course no difficulty identifying a hard core of institutions and policy areas 
where democratic self-determination at the national level ought to prevail over Euro-
pean interventions. More over, the court also emphasizes the “integration openness” 
and the “Europe-friendliness” of the German constitution, and it asserts its full support 
for this constitutional commitment to European integration. In other words, the deci-
sion avers the court’s willingness to strike a fair balance between European and national 
concerns in its future decisions. On the basis of its past record, there is surely no reason 
to doubt these commitments. 
Nevertheless, the decision appears fundamentally flawed because the court has failed to 
consider its generalized implications in the light of the Kantian categorical imperative. 
The authority claimed by the German court could of course not be denied to the courts 
in all member states. And while these would surely be equally sensitive to the specific 
and diverse concerns of national autonomy and identity, there is no reason to expect 
that their understandings of the “Europe-friendliness” of their national constitutions 
would converge, or that they would all assign the same relative weights to the European 
concerns at stake. The overall result might be a chaotic form of differentiated integra-
tion through an accumulation and perhaps escalation of unilateral national opt-outs. 
I have tried to show that the ECJ’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz is not only distorting the 
vertical balance between the powers of the Union and the requirements of democratic 
self-determination in its member states, but that it also has an asymmetric impact on 
the horizontal balance between social market economies and liberal market economies. 
This double asymmetry is presently undermining political support for European inte-
gration and weakening democratic legitimacy at the national level. It needs to be chal-
lenged and corrected in order to reestablish a workable balance between the equally sa-
lient values of European “community” and national “autonomy.” But a normatively and 
pragmatically acceptable balance cannot be achieved by asserting the power of national 
high courts to declare unilateral opt-outs from European law in procedures in which 
the interests of other EU member states and the concerns of the Union have no voice at 
all. The Lisbon decision may not provoke escalating conflicts culminating in secession 
and civil war – as the assertion of John C. Calhoun’s nullification doctrine had done in 
the decades preceding the American civil war (Bancroft 2008; Ellis 1989). But it may still 
have severely disruptive effects in the European Union as well. 
55 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 at §§ 238–241.
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What we need instead are procedures that facilitate the mutual accommodation of Eu-
ropean and national concerns. Here it does indeed make sense to leave the definition of 
fundamental national concerns to national governments or national courts, rather than 
to the uncertain empathy of the ECJ. But there must be a possibility of review in the 
light of similarly or more salient European concerns. One possible solution has recently 
been proposed by a former chief justice of the German constitutional court (Herzog/
Gerken 2008). It would allow ECJ judgments to be appealed to a European Consti-
tutional Court composed of the chief justices of all EU member states. For reasons 
explained elsewhere, I would prefer a political, rather than a purely judicial solution 
– which would again have to define general criteria that could not accommodate the di-
versity of legitimate national concerns. Instead, the political solution I proposed would 
allow member governments to appeal to the judgment of their peers in the European 
Council in cases where European law is felt to impose unacceptably tight constraints on 
politically highly salient national concerns (Scharpf 2009). 
There may well be other and better solutions, but none of them will come about unless 
the “good Europeans” in Continental and Scandinavian social market economies real-
ize that integration through law is a mode of policy-making that is structurally biased 
against their interests and normative preferences. It systematically weakens their estab-
lished socioeconomic regimes at the national level and it also generates a liberalizing bias 
in European legislation. Furthermore, they should understand that the socioeconomic 
asymmetry of European law is caused by structural conditions whose effect does not 
depend on the ideological orientations of members of the Court or the Commission. 
For this same reason, it can hardly be corrected through changes in the party-political 
composition of the Council or through elections to the European Parliament. 
In short, good Europeans need to draw a distinction between their continuing support 
for political and social integration in Europe on the one hand, and their unquestion-
ing acceptance of policy choices dictated by a nonaccountable judicial authority on the 
other hand. A European social market economy cannot come about, and social market 
economies at the national level will be destroyed, unless the politically uncontrolled 
dynamics of (negative) “Integration through Law” can be contained.
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